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Case Note
Rodriguez v. Swartz: Civil Lawsuit Immunity in Border
Shootings1
Alexis Woolison2
A. I. Introduction
When federal agents exhibit conduct that violates the United
States Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that those agents
should be held civilly liable for their actions, as shown by its
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.3 Applicable constitutional violations include
those which infringe on any individuals’ constitutional rights. This
includes violations of the constitutional rights of noncitizens.
Although the Supreme Court disfavors expansion of Bivens claims
and has only extended this remedy twice, in Davis v. Passman and
Carlson v. Green, the Ninth Circuit Court recently approved such
expansion in a cross-border shooting case, Rodriguez v. Swartz. That
decision created a circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,
which is especially relevant as those Circuits include two-thirds of
the courts along the United States border with Mexico. The decision
of whether to extend Bivens remedies requires a careful analysis
involving sensitive issues relevant to each case; in this case, most
notably, foreign affairs, national security, and extraterritorial
matters. When used appropriately, interpretations like the Ninth
Circuit’s allow constitutional integrity to be upheld and prevent
qualified immunity of government officials from being
overzealously applied.
1
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II. Facts
Shortly before midnight on October 10, 2012 a United States
Border Patrol agent shot an unarmed, sixteen-year-old boy walking
down the street in Mexico.4 The agent, Lonnie Swartz, was on duty
on the American side of the border with Mexico when he spotted the
young boy, José Antonio Elena Rodriguez (hereafter “J.A.”),
walking alone down the Calle Internacional, a street in Nogales,
Mexico that runs parallel to the border.5 From his high vantage point
atop a rock wall that was 25 feet higher than the road J.A. was
walking on, Swartz fired between 14 and 30 bullets through a steel
beam fence at J.A. Ten of those bullets hit J.A., mainly in the back,
and killed him instantly.6
Prior to the shooting, J.A. was walking peacefully down the
Calle Internacional, unarmed and showing no signs of violence,
aggression, or any other threatening behavior against anyone or
anything. He was shot by Swartz without warning or provocation,
despite posing no threat to Swartz or anyone else.7 It was unknown
to Swartz at the time of the shooting whether J.A. was armed,
whether he had ever visited the United States, and whether he had
any connections to the United States.8
Furthermore, the street J.A. was walking on separates
Nogales, Arizona, from Nogales, Mexico, is the main thoroughfare
of that area, and is lined with many commercial and residential
buildings.9 Families live on both sides of the border and it is
common for people to cross from one side to the other for various
reasons.10 In fact, at the time of the shooting J.A.'s grandparents
lived on the American side of the border in Arizona as lawful United
4
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States permanent residents and often crossed into Mexico to visit
J.A. and his family.11 Although J.A. had never been to the United
States, Swartz could not have known this at the time of the
shooting.12 In actuality, Swartz did not even know whether J.A. was
an American or Mexican citizen when he shot him across the
border.13
III. Procedural Posture
Acting both individually and as a personal representative of
J.A.’s estate, Araceli Rodriguez, J.A.’s mother, brought suit against
Swartz in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
for money damages.14 Suing under a Bivens cause of action, which
allows civil suits to be brought following constitutional rights
violations, Rodriguez alleged that J.A.’s Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights were violated by Swartz when he killed J.A.
without any justification.15 Although Swartz conceded that
Rodriguez had a Bivens cause of action under the Fourth
Amendment, he moved to dismiss the complaint based on qualified
immunity.16 The district court denied Swartz’ claim of qualified
immunity and dismissed Rodriguez’ Fifth Amendment claim,
treating the shooting as a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment.17
In response, Swartz filed an appeal in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to challenge the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity and the allowance of a Bivens
cause of action.18
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IV. Background Discussion
A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, the Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth
Amendment provides a basis for a federal cause of action for
damages arising out of an unreasonable search and seizure.19
Reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the Court held that violation of Fourth Amendment rights
by federal agents acting under color of their authority gives rise to
causes of action for damages consequent to the unconstitutional
conduct.20
On November 26, 1965, Webster Bivens’ apartment was
searched by six federal agents without a search or arrest warrant, in
an unreasonable manner.21 Bivens was arrested and put in manacles
in front of his wife and children, who were also threatened with
arrest, while the entire house was thoroughly searched.22 Further,
subsequent to the search, Bivens was arrested for violating narcotics
laws and booked at the Federal Narcotic Bureau.23 During this
ordeal, Bivens was also interrogated by the agents and subjected to
a visual strip search.24 Although the complaint against Bivens was
ultimately dismissed, he stated that the nature of his search and
arrest caused him “great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental
suffering.”25

19
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As a result of this, Bivens brought suit against the agents,
seeking damages for the unlawful search and seizure.26 The district
court dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§1331, and alternatively for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted.27 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that the district court did in fact have jurisdiction under §1331,
relying on the decision in Bell v. Hood.28 In Bell, the Supreme Court
held that district courts have jurisdiction to determine whether
Fourth Amendment complaints state sufficient federal causes of
action.29 Despite this finding, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision to dismiss the claim for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted, and held that the Fourth
Amendment does not authorize private suits for damages caused by
unreasonable search and seizures brought under §1331 federal
question jurisdiction.30
On appeal in the Supreme Court, the question previously
reserved by the Court in Bell regarding whether violation of Fourth
Amendment rights by federal agents gives rise to causes of action
for damages was considered.31 In its opinion, the Supreme Court
highlighted the power inequalities between citizens and federal
agents as a reason for reaching this decision.32 An agent acting under
the power of the United States has a far greater capacity for harm
than an individual, which is why the Fourth Amendment operates as
a limitation upon the exercise of federal power.33 When that
authorized power is abused, the courts must be able to adjust their
remedies to grant the necessary relief.34 As the Court explained,
damages have historically been regarded as the ordinary remedy for
invasions of personal interests in liberty, so it should be unsurprising
26
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that damages may be obtained for injuries resulting from
constitutional rights violations.35
Thus, the Supreme Court held that constitutional violations
do give rise to civil causes of action for damages and that in Bivens’
case his embarrassment and mental suffering, as well as the agents’
lack of probable cause, constituted such a violation.36 As a result,
Bivens was entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he
suffered as a result of the violations from each agent.37
B. Ziglar v. Abbasi
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens, the
implied cause of action theory adopted in that case was again
considered by the Court in Ziglar v. Abbasi.38 In Ziglar, the Court
considered whether to allow an action for money damages in the
absence of congressional authorization in regard to detention policy
and prison abuse claims.39
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, hundreds of
undocumented immigrants were taken into custody and held by
order of the United States Government.40 Although some of these
detentions were based on well-grounded suspicions, many others
were likely based on fear of Arabs and Muslims.41 The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter “FBI”) questioned more than
1,000 people with suspected links to the September 11 attacks,
resulting in the arrest and detention of more than 700 individuals on
immigration charges.42 Although, if a detainee was designated as not
being “of interest” to the investigation, they were processed
according to normal procedures; if they were designated as “of
35
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interest” to the investigation, they were subject to a “hold-untilcleared policy” and held without bail.43
Many of these detainees were held for weeks or even months
at a time under harsh conditions while agents tried to determine
whether they were connected to the terrorism.44 According to the
complaint, detainees were held in “tiny cells for over 23 hours a day”
with the lights left on 24 hours a day.45 They were not afforded
sufficient opportunities to exercise or participate in recreation, were
denied access to even basic hygiene products such as soap and
toothbrushes, and were shackled and escorted by four guards
whenever they were removed from their cells.46 In addition, they
were not allowed to communicate with the outside world, were
frequently strip-searched, and subjected to “physical and verbal
abuse” from many of the prison guards.47
As a result, six of these detainees later filed suit for
compensatory and punitive damages alleging Fourth and Fifth
Amendment constitutional violations on their own behalf and on
behalf of a putative class.48 Three high executive officers in the
Department of Justice and two of the detainees’ facility wardens
were named as defendants in the complaint.49 Although the District
Court dismissed the claims against the Executive Officials, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and
ruled that the complaint was sufficient for the action to proceed
against the officials.50
When considering whether the officials could be sued for
damages under a Bivens remedy, the Court discussed the interpretive
framework under which there was a possibility that “the Court
would keep expanding Bivens until it became the substantial
43
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equivalent of 42 U.S.C. §1983.”51 However, the Court also
recognized that in cases following Bivens it cautioned that where
Congress “intends private litigants to have a cause of action,” the
“far better course” is for Congress to confer that remedy in explicit
terms.52 Therefore, the Court highlighted that when deciding
whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the “determinative”
question is one of statutory intent.53 If Congress intended to create
the private right of action asserted, then a cause of action may be
recognized; however, absent such intent, recognizing an implied
cause of action is inappropriate.54
As such, the Court made clear that expanding the Bivens
remedy is now a “disfavored” judicial activity with separation-ofpowers principles being central to the analysis, asking the question
whether it should be up to Congress or the courts to decide whether
to provide for a damages remedy.55 Based on the Court’s precedents,
a Bivens remedy will not be available if there are “special factors
counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress.”56 Although the Court has not defined specific special
factors, the inference is that any factor that would cause a court to
hesitate before answering in the affirmative is such a factor.57
Further, the existence of alternative remedies usually precludes a
court from authorizing a Bivens action.58
Because the Court of Appeals failed to analyze the prisoner
abuse claims regarding the presence of special factors counseling
hesitation, the Supreme Court remanded to allow the Court of
Appeals to consider the claim in light of such a determination.59
However, in regard to the detention policy claims the Court held that
51
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an action for money damages was not allowed and the Bivens
remedy should not be extended.60
C. Hernandez v. Mesa
In Hernandez v. Mesa, the United States Supreme Court
returned an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
following a ruling from the Supreme Court that the issue of whether
federal courts have the authority to craft implied damages actions
for alleged constitutional violations needed to be more carefully
considered.61 After such considerations, the Fifth Circuit held that
the transnational aspect of the particular facts of the case presented
a new context under a Bivens cause of action, but that numerous
special factors were counseling against federal court interference
under a balance of powers analysis.62
As the facts in the complaint alleged, Sergio Hernandez, a
15-year-old boy, was shot and killed by Agent Mesa on June 7,
2010.63 Hernandez was a Mexican citizen without family in or any
other ties to the United States.64 He was playing on the Mexican side
of the border, in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, while Agent Mesa was
stationed on the United States side of the border, in El Paso, Texas.65
While engaging in his law enforcement duties, Agent Mesa noticed
a group of young men throwing rocks at him from the Mexican side
of the border.66 In response, Agent Mesa fired several shots toward
the assailants and fatally wounded Hernandez in the process.67
Following the death of their son, Hernandez’s parents
brought suit in federal court against Agent Mesa, alleging, among
other things, a Bivens cause of action under the Fourth and Fifth
60
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Amendments.68 Although the federal district court dismissed all
claims, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and allowed the
Bivens claim to proceed.69 However, upon rehearing the appeal en
banc, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the claim failed because Agent
Mesa was shielded by qualified immunity from any claim under the
Fifth Amendment.70 On appeal in the Supreme Court, the Court
remanded and ordered the Fifth Circuit to reconsider allowing
Bivens claims to proceed on behalf of the Hernandez family in light
of the Court’s decision in Abbasi, in which it remanded for
reconsideration by the appeals court as to whether a Bivens claim
could be maintained against a prison warden.71
In regard to possible alternative remedies, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained that because there is no
federal statute authorizing damage actions by foreign citizens by
federal law enforcement officers under these circumstances, the
plaintiffs’ only possible recovery of damages exists if the federal
courts approve a Bivens implied cause of action.72 However, before
approving an implied cause of action under Abbasi, the court first
had to determine whether the circumstances of the case presented a
“new context” for Bivens claims, and then, if so, whether the
circumstances presented any “special factors counseling hesitation”
against implying damage claims against an individual federal
officer.73
In determining whether there was a new context in a
particular case, the court stated that the relevant inquiry is whether
“the case is different in a meaningful way” from prior Bivens
cases.74 This means that a case deriving from an unconstitutional
search and seizure claim is not determinative, as even a modest

68
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extension is still an extension.75 Because Hernandez was a Mexican
citizen shot on Mexican soil and there has been no judicial guidance
concerning the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution as it applies
to foreign citizens on foreign soil, the court held that the facts
presented a new context for a Bivens claim.76
Moving on to the special factors analysis, the court
considered whether allowing a Bivens action to proceed based upon
a Fifth Amendment excessive force claim would present any special
factors counseling hesitation.77 In making this determination, the
court explained that the presence of any special factors precludes a
Bivens extension.78 Focusing its inquiry on maintaining the
separation of powers, the court found several special factors
presented by the facts of the case.79
As one of the special factors, the court highlighted the threat
to national security implicated by the involvement of the Border
Patrol, as that is the prerogative of Congress and the President.80 The
court worried that permitting Bivens liability could undermine the
Border Patrol’s ability to perform national security duties by causing
agents to “hesitate in making split second decisions” in the future.81
The court also discussed the possible negative impact on foreign
affairs and diplomacy in a broader sense that could be caused if a
Bivens cause of action were allowed.82 Finally, the court touched on
Congress’ failure to provide damages as a remedy in these
circumstances and the extraterritorial nature of the claims as
additional special factors counseling hesitation, considering
Congress’ silence as relevant and telling.83
Because the presence of any special factor counseling
hesitation precludes a Bivens remedy, and several were enunciated
75
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in its opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment
and decided against extending Bivens to apply to the case.84
V. Ninth Circuit Decision in Rodriguez v. Swartz
Swartz filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit to challenge the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity and the Bivens cause of action brought by
Rodriguez.85 In deciding whether to let Rodriguez’s Fourth
Amendment claim proceed, the court considered whether qualified
immunity was applicable considering the circumstances of the case,
whether the Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable
force to “seize” a person applied in the case, and whether the Bivens
cause of action could and should be extended in response to the
case.86 Because the court determined that qualified immunity was
applicable, J.A.’s Fourth Amendment right was violated, and the
Bivens cause of action could and should be extended, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to let Rodriguez’s
Fourth Amendment claim proceed.87
B. Qualified Immunity
The Ninth Circuit court first looked at whether Swartz was
entitled to qualified immunity because he was on duty as a United
States Border Patrol agent at the time of the shooting.88 Qualified
immunity protects public officials, such as federal agents, from
liability for civil damages so long as their conduct does not violate
clearly established constitutional rights which a “reasonable person”
would have known.89 Therefore, in making this determination the
court considered two main questions: (1) whether the officer’s
84
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conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right
was clearly established at the time of the incident.90 A constitutional
right is considered “clearly established” at the time of an incident if
every reasonable officer would have understood that what he or she
was doing violated that right.91 The court held that no reasonable
officer could have thought that they could kill J.A. without
justification based on the facts at hand, so it found that J.A.’s Fourth
Amendment right was both violated and clearly established at the
time of the incident, and therefore that Swartz lacked qualified
immunity.92
C. Fourth Amendment Rights
As part of its qualified immunity analysis the Ninth Circuit
court also considered whether Fourth Amendment rights applied to
J.A. as a Mexican citizen, and whether those rights were violated
when Swartz shot him.93 The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution prohibits law enforcement officers from using
“objectively unreasonable” force to “seize” a person.94 Following
the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor, the court
determined that the “reasonableness” of Swartz’s use of force
should be based on the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene at the time of the incident, in order to avoid causing hindsight
bias.95
The court also cited the Supreme Court’s decision in
Tennessee v. Garner, which held that even when a felony suspect
tries to escape, where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the
officer or others, the harm from failing to apprehend the suspect
does not justify the officer’s use of deadly force.96 Based on this, the
90
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court determined that any reasonable law enforcement officer
should know not to shoot to kill unless the suspect presents an
immediate threat to the officer or others or their escape will result in
a serious threat of injury to others.97 Because J.A. presented no
immediate threat, or any threat at all, to Swartz or others, and further
was not even suspected of any crime let alone a felony, the use of
deadly force was not justified and could not have been considered
justified by any reasonable officer on the scene at the time.98
Therefore, the court held that Swartz did not have to determine how
much force to use to be considered “reasonable,” as he was not
permitted to use any force whatsoever against someone innocently
walking down the street in Mexico.99
However, despite this clear finding of unreasonable force by
Swartz, the circuit court also had to consider Swartz’ argument that
he did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not apply to
the search and seizure of a non-citizen’s property that was located
abroad, as held in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.100 As J.A.
was a Mexican citizen who was shot, and thus “seized,” in Mexico,
the court had to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applied
under those conditions.101 Although J.A. was a Mexican citizen shot
on Mexican soil, the court found that those factors were not
dispositive to a finding against Fourth Amendment protection
because neither citizenship nor voluntary submission to American
law is a prerequisite for constitutional rights.102
Instead, the court distinguished this case from VerdugoUrquidez in that Swartz acted on American instead of Mexican soil
and therefore was controlled by American law, and unlike the agents
in that case, did not know whether J.A. was an American citizen or
not.103 The court also held that the concerns in Verdugo-Urquidez
97
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regarding regulating conduct on Mexican soil were not relevant in
this case because rather than searches and seizures conducted on
Mexican soil, this case concerned the use of deadly force against a
Mexican citizen on American soil.104 For those reasons, the court
held that there were no practical reasons to caution against extending
Fourth Amendment protection to include innocent people shot by
American officers. It further found that J.A. had a Fourth
Amendment right to be free from the objectively unreasonable use
of force by an American agent acting on American soil, despite his
status as a Mexican citizen and the fact that he was shot on Mexican
soil.105
D. Extending the Bivens Remedy
After determining that Swartz did not have qualified
immunity and J.A. had a Fourth Amendment right to freedom from
unreasonable force, the Ninth Circuit court next turned to the
question of whether Bivens could and should be extended to allow
Rodriguez to sue for money damages.106 The Supreme Court in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal
agents gave rise to a cause of action for money damages after Bivens
was arrested and his home was searched by federal agents without
probable cause or a search warrant.107 In that case the Court held
that Bivens was entitled to sue the agents for money damages
because: (1) there were no “special factors” counseling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress, and (2) because
damages were the “only possible remedy” for Bivens.108
The Bivens remedy has been extended by the Supreme Court
in subsequent cases to include other causes of action as well, such
as employment discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment
104
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in Davis v. Passman and inadequate medical attention in prisons in
violation of the Eighth Amendment in Carlson v. Green.109 The
Court has explained that Bivens actions are desirable deterrents
against abusive federal employees by allowing plaintiffs to sue
agents directly for certain constitutional violations.110 Although
Bivens remedies are not appropriate in every situation or for every
constitutional violation and courts should therefore exercise caution
in determining whether to extend Bivens, in cases where a new
context that is meaningfully different from previous Bivens cases
decided by the Supreme Court is presented such extension is
proper.111
As such, in determining whether a Bivens remedy should be
extended in this case, the Ninth Circuit court looked at whether there
were any special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress, whether money damages were the
only possible remedy, and whether this represented a new context
that is meaningfully different from previous Bivens cases decided
by the Supreme Court.112 Turning first to the latter requirement, the
court decided that this case presented a new Bivens context that was
meaningfully different from previous cases.113 Although, like
Bivens, this case involved a federal law enforcement officer
violating the Fourth Amendment, unlike Bivens the remedy would
be applied to an alien who was killed outside of the United States.114
Thus, this difference is adequate to represent a new context
justifying extension.115
a. Adequate Alternative Remedies

109
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Even though the court decided that the Bivens remedy could
be extended in this case because it represented a new context, in
order for an extension to be appropriate there must also be a finding
of no other adequate remedy and no special factors counseling
hesitation.116 Focusing next on the alternative adequate remedy
requirement, the court determined that Rodriguez had no other
adequate remedies and therefore that that requirement was
satisfied.117 Although Swartz argued that Rodriguez had satisfactory
alternative remedies in the form of tort claims, restitution, and
through the Mexican judicial system, the court disagreed.118
Because the United States has sovereign immunity under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (hereafter “FTCA”), it cannot be sued
without its consent, specifically for claims “arising in a foreign
country,” as they do here.119 Therefore, since J.A. was shot while in
Mexico, the United States cannot be sued under a tort claim for
J.A.’s deadly injury under the FTCA.120 However, this does not
preclude a Bivens remedy because it arises under United States
constitutional law, rather than Mexican law, and does not implicate
the application of substantive foreign law, which was what Congress
sought to avoid by the FTCA foreign country exception.121
Additionally, under a Bivens cause of action, agents can be sued
individually and held accountable for his or her own actions, while
under the FCTA the United States is held liable for agents’ actions
when they were acting as a federal agent within the scope of their
employment at the time of the incident.122 However, there is an
exception under the FCTA that allows Bivens claims to proceed
against individuals when a civil action is brought against an
employee of the Government for a violation of the Constitution of

116
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the United States.123 Because this case involves the violation of the
Fourth Amendment, it is a proper context for a Bivens remedy in
order to prevent Swartz from dodging liability from his own
constitutional violations by imposing it onto the government.124
Further, the court also held that Rodriguez has no adequate
alternative remedy under a state law tort claim against Swartz.125
Disagreeing with the United States’ suggestion that Rodriguez could
sue Swartz for wrongful death under Arizona tort law, the court
explained that such a claim would be barred by the Westfall Act,
which accords federal employees absolute immunity from common
law tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of
their official duties.126 Because Swartz shot J.A. while on duty as a
Border Patrol agent on the United States side of the fence, it must
be assumed that he acted within the scope of his employment.127
Therefore, even though he violated clearly established rules
regulating employee conduct, Rodriguez cannot sue him in a state
law tort action without converting it into an FTCA suit against the
United States, and the foreign country exception would bar an
FTCA suit because the injury occurred in Mexico.128
Additionally, restitution was also held by the court not to be
an adequate alternative justifying precluding extending a Bivens
remedy.129 Even though Swartz was indicted and tried by the United
States for the murder of J.A., and acquitted of murder by a jury,
which could have led
to Swartz being required to pay restitution
to J.A.’s estate if he had been convicted, this is still not an adequate
alternative remedy for various reasons.130 One reason is that a
criminal charge is the government’s remedy, not the victim’s, as it
is up to their discretion whether to charge the agent.131 Another
123
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reason is that the preponderance of evidence of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt required in criminal cases is higher than that
required by Bivens claims, which only require a jury to find that it
was more likely than not that the agent used unreasonable force.132
This means that even if acquitted of his criminal charges, Swartz
could still be liable for money damages under a Bivens remedy.133
Because of this disparity, the court held that the potential restitution
that could result from a murder conviction was not a sufficient
alternate remedy to justify preventing Rodriguez’ Bivens claim from
proceeding.134
Finally, because Swartz did not provide an adequate
argument suggesting that Rodriguez would be able to bring a claim
in the Mexican judicial system, the court also held that there was no
adequate alternative remedy in that regard.135 Because Swartz
provided no alternative remedies, the court next turned to a
determination of whether any factors counseling hesitation would
justify preventing a Bivens claim from being brought by
Rodriguez.136
b. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation
Although the Ninth Circuit court determined that Rodriguez’
only available adequate remedy was a Bivens action, it still could
not extend Bivens unless no “special factors” counseled hesitation
against doing so.137 In making this determination the court looked at
highly case specific factors such as governmental policies, national
security, foreign policy and extraterritorial remedies, rather than
those at cross-border shootings at an abstract level.138 In regard to
governmental policies, the court held that because Rodriguez did not
challenge any governmental policies, and Swartz did not follow any
132
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governmental policies, there was no special factor counseling
hesitation in that regard.139 A special factor is present when a
plaintiff challenges high-level executive branch policies because a
Bivens claim is not a proper vehicle for altering the entity’s policy,
but that is not the case here.140 Rodriguez did not sue a policymaking official, but rather an officer, and federal regulations
expressly prohibited Swartz’s conduct in using deadly force under
the circumstances.141 Therefore, because this case involved
“standard law enforcement operations” and “individual instances of
law enforcement overreach” rather than governmental policies or
policymakers, a Bivens remedy is still applicable.142
Next, the court looked at whether extending Bivens would
implicate national security, which would be a special factor
counseling hesitation.143 Although the court considered the concerns
highlighted in Ziglar v. Abbasi, in which the Court held that there
were national security concerns because the plaintiffs in that case
challenged the government’s response to September 11 and how
best to protect the United States, it also cautioned against not using
national security concerns to “ward off inconvenient claims.”144
While national security concerns are implicated with Border Patrol
agents as they protect the United States from unlawful entries and
terrorist threats, it is not reasonable to suggest that part of national
security involves shooting innocent people walking down the street
in Mexico.145 In addition, the court claimed that holding Swartz
liable for his constitutional violation would not deter other Border
Patrol agents from performing their duties, because the conduct
exhibited by Swartz was not typical of the conduct generally
required, expected, and accepted of Border Patrol agents.146
139
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Therefore, the court held that national security was not a special
factor applicable in this case, and did not justify precluding
Rodriguez’ Bivens claim.147
The court also looked at whether any problematic foreign
policy implications could be caused by extending Bivens in this
case.148 Although, as argued by the United States, the nature of
cross-border shootings implicates foreign policy, the court
determined that in this case a Bivens application would not
undermine any American foreign policy.149 The court found that
there is no American foreign policy endorsing shootings like the one
presented here involving a Border Patrol agent shooting an innocent
Mexican citizen.150 In fact, as the court explained, if a Bivens cause
of action was not extended international relations between America
and Mexico would likely be threatened, because it would allow
Swartz to escape civil liability for his unreasonable use of deadly
force.151 Therefore, no special factor in regard to foreign policy
counseled hesitation against allowing Rodriguez to bring a Bivens
claim.152
Finally, the court considered whether any presumption that
would constitute a special factor against extraterritorial remedies
had been rebutted.153 Although the court did not disagree with the
dissent’s suggestion that the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of statutes suggested an analogous presumption against
extraterrestrial Bivens claims, it still found that the presumption
could be overcome because actions touching and concerning the
territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the
presumption existed.154 Because Swartz was acting within his
capacity as a United States Border Patrol agent and shot J.A. from
147
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his location on American soil, his actions touched and concerned the
territory of the United States.155 Further, the United States’ interest
in regulating the conduct of government officials on American soil
was reflected by its willingness to apply criminal law
extraterritorially when it charged Swartz with murder.156 Because
this interest in deterring unconstitutional misconduct of officers is
sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterrestrial
Bivens claims, the court held that there was no special factor
counseling hesitation in that respect and Rodriguez’ claim was not
barred.157
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit court decided that Swartz was
not entitled to qualified immunity in this case, the Fourth
Amendment was applicable, and the Bivens remedy could be
extended due to the inadequacy of other alternative remedies and the
lack of special factors counseling hesitation against extension.158
E. Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Smith’s main disagreement with the
majority opinion is that it oversteps separation of powers principles
and that its determination of a lack of special factors counseling
hesitation against extending Bivens is inaccurate.159 He also argues
that the majority places undue significance on insufficient
alternative remedies, as only the presence of one is relevant as it
precludes a Bivens expansion.160 In regard to separation of powers,
Justice Smith argues that the majority oversteps by deciding on the
issue of whether to provide a damages remedy when such a question
should be answered by Congress.161 His opinion states that the
judiciary lacks the authority to extend Bivens to the case’s cross155

Id.
Id.
157
Id. at 748.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 749.
160
Id. at 756.
161
Id. at 749.
156

22

border context, especially in light of the case presenting a new
Bivens context, which he claims the majority downplays in its
analysis.162 He disagrees with the majority primarily because
previous Bivens remedies have not involved extraterritorial
components or national security implications.163
Additionally, Justice Smith also finds that the majority
overlooked several special factors counseling hesitation.164
Focusing on the Supreme Court’s determination that “the inquiry
must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent
congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs
and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed,” he argues
that the implication of foreign relations, border security, Congress’
failure to provide a damages remedy, and the cross-border nature of
the case are all special factors.165 Because only one special factor is
necessary to preclude Bivens claims proceeding, Justice Smith
argued against the majority’s opinion to allow the claim and agreed
with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Hernandez.166
VI. Analysis
The Ninth Circuit Court’s decision in Rodriguez following
the Fifth Circuit’s contrary decision in Hernandez created a circuit
split that has yet to be resolved. This is especially problematic as it
means that two of the three Mexican-United States border touching
federal circuit courts are split, which has significant negative
implications for border-related issues. Although both cases
recognize that the relevant circumstances present a new Bivens
context, they disagree over the existence of any special factors
counseling hesitation against extending a Bivens cause of action, and
the importance of the presence, or lack thereof, of alternative
remedies. Both cases have similar facts, involving cross-border
162
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shootings of Mexican citizens by United States Border Patrol
Agents, and implicate particular issues relevant to such
circumstances. Nevertheless, in Hernandez the court decided not to
extend a Bivens remedy and held that the agent was entitled to
qualified immunity, while in Rodriguez the court disagreed and held
that qualified immunity did not apply and allowed a Bivens remedy.
A. New Bivens Context
Both the Fifth Circuit court in Hernandez and the Ninth
Circuit Court in Rodriguez agreed that these circumstances would
represent a new Bivens context, although they disagreed on the
impact of that determination on allowing such a cause of action to
proceed. While the Fifth Circuit found creating a new context to be
a factor weighing against allowing a Bivens cause of the action, the
Ninth Circuit merely took it as the first step in its overall analysis.
Although the Fifth Circuit was correct to exercise some caution in
allowing a new context as the Supreme Court has stated that doing
so is judicially disfavored, it is not meant to be a complete bar. When
necessary and so long as the other requirements are satisfied, Bivens
is permitted to be extended in order to provide civil remedies to
individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated.
Therefore, by focusing too much on its concerns about allowing a
new context in the first place, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis was
skewed in favor of confirming qualified immunity from the
beginning, before the rest of the analysis involving special factors
counseling hesitation and adequate alternative remedies was even
discussed.
In circumstances such as these, where a foreign citizen has
been shot from across the border by a United States border patrol
agent without provocation, it is clear that Bivens would have to be
extended to allow a remedy to go through. Previous Bivens contexts
approved by the Supreme Court have included constitutional
violations of the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in Davis
v. Passman, and of the Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment in Carlson v. Green. Although
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extension happens rarely, that does not mean it should not happen
when appropriate. Furthermore, in these types of cases, where
Bivens causes of action are the only remedy of individuals whose
constitutional rights have been so egregiously violated and no
special factors counsel hesitation, it is not only appropriate but
necessary to ensure justice.
B. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation
The disagreement over the existence of special factors
counseling hesitation represents the main reason for the disparity in
holdings between the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts. The threshold
for such factors is low, as the presence of even one precludes Bivens
claims from reaching fruition. However, even though the Fifth
Circuit enumerated several relevant factors, the Ninth Circuit
identified none. These alternate conclusions show that this type of
analysis is dependent on the view from which it is taken and
significantly influenced by the opinions of those making the
determination. By focusing on the possibility of potential negative
outcomes in the abstract, however likely or unlikely, the Fifth
Circuit was able to identify several possible factors. In contrast, by
focusing more on the likely outcomes of each case-specific
component, the Ninth Circuit found no factors counseling hesitation.
More guidance as to what constitutes “hesitation” and how to go
about the analysis being provided by the Supreme Court could help
overcome these disagreements and prevent circuit splits such as the
one that has occurred here.
The factors found by the Fifth Circuit to be special and
counseling hesitation were the impact on foreign affairs, the threat
to national security, and the extraterritorial nature of the case. In
regard to foreign affairs, the court worried that allowing civil
liability could cause a negative impact on foreign affairs by creating
tension between the American and Mexican governments. However,
the same could also be true for not allowing civil liability. The
killing of unarmed Mexican citizens across the border by United
States government agents, especially the killing of children who did
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nothing to provoke those agents, is a highly sensitive and
complicated issue. In such cases those individuals have the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and not
providing the families of those individuals the ability to access civil
remedies in response to those violations is far more concerning than
any inevitable tension that may result from the litigation in the first
place. Although foreign affairs implications are certainly a major
consideration in the Bivens analysis, under these circumstances the
potential negative impacts of not allowing civil litigation to proceed
are more like a special factor counseling hesitation against denying
a Bivens extension.
Moving next to national security considerations, the Fifth
Circuit again argued that allowing a Bivens extension in these types
of cases could have a negative impact, this time on the national
security of the United States. Specifically, the court worried that
allowing a Bivens remedy could cause border patrol agents to
hesitate when making split second decisions in the future and
therefore undermine their ability to perform their duties. What that
court failed to consider, however, was that imparting increased
hesitation on border patrol agents in the future may in fact be a good
thing. When there are multiple instances of border patrol agents
shooting innocent people, innocent children, without hesitation, that
suggests that split second decisions can cause agents to overreact
and end lives for no legally or morally sufficient reason. Such
actions obviously constitute an infringement on justice and
constitutional rights. Furthermore, punishing agents who react in
this way would only have an impact on agents who are acting
unreasonably, because only those who act unreasonably lose the
protection of qualified immunity in the first place. Holding agents
accountable for their unreasonable actions would not undermine the
effectiveness of those agents who act appropriately, and actually
may improve the overall success of national security by creating
increased caution and awareness in border patrol agents in general.
The Ninth Circuit was therefore sound in its reasoning that this
factor, although highly relevant, is not one counseling hesitation
against allowing a Bivens cause of action.
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Finally, the Fifth Circuit also highlighted the extraterritorial
nature of the claims as a special factor counseling hesitation.
Although in the abstract this may seem to be logical, looking more
narrowly at the specific facts of the case shows that the contrary
opinion may also be reached. The previous factors of foreign affairs
and national security overlap with this factor, so it makes sense that
a court that found that those factors counseled hesitation would find
the same for this factor as well, while a court that reached the
opposite conclusion would again disagree. By looking at the specific
facts of these cases, wherein innocent Mexican children were shot
from across the border by United States Border Patrol agents, a court
could actually find that not allowing civil liability is what really
counsels hesitation. Although the cross-border nature of these
claims caused increased complications and tensions between both
governments, that alone is not dispositive to preclude Bivens claims.
Because even foreign citizens residing in foreign countries have
constitutional protections under these circumstances, they should
not be denied the possibility of obtaining civil remedies for such
heinous violations merely because they were on the opposite side of
the border.
C. Alternative Remedies
Although both the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts agreed that
in these cases the affected individuals had no other adequate
remedies, the Fifth Circuit did not find this to be very impactful on
the overall Bivens analysis, while the Ninth Circuit made it a focus.
The unequal weight given to this component suggests that additional
clarification by the Supreme Court on the importance of a lack of
adequate alternative remedies would be helpful going forward. The
Fifth Circuit seems to suggest that Congress’ failure to provide a
damages remedy in these circumstances is telling, and therefore that
a lack of adequate alternative remedies does not necessitate allowing
the creation of a new Bivens context. The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, discussed the lack of alternative remedies such as tort claims,
restitution, and the Mexican court system at length in its opinion,
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ultimately concluding that the lack not only allowed the analysis to
proceed to the determination of special factors counseling
hesitation, but that it weighed in favor of extending a Bivens remedy.
Although having clear damages remedies provided by
Congress in these circumstances would be extremely helpful for
determining when qualified immunity may be overcome, the lack of
such clarity does not mean qualified immunity must therefore
always be permitted. That would negate the purpose of the Supreme
Court allowing Bivens claims from the outset. Instead, the presence,
or lack thereof, of alternative remedies should be treated as one
factor in the overall analysis. In this case, as enunciated by the Ninth
Circuit, there are not adequate alternative remedies other than
through a Bivens cause of action. This means that the only civil
remedy the mothers of these children who were killed by United
States border patrol agents have is to pursue such a claim. The only
way that justice can be upheld, and the agents held civilly
accountable is for the courts to take this lack of alternative remedies
significantly into consideration when deciding whether to extend
Bivens and defeat qualified immunity.
D. Overall Effect of Extending Bivens
All of these individual components must be considered when
determining whether or not to extend Bivens. Although doing so is
indeed considered a judicially disfavored action that must be treated
with caution, too much caution could alternatively frustrate the
original purpose of preventing the infringement by government
officials on individuals’ constitutional rights. Additionally, if the
Fifth Circuit Court’s determination that special factors counseling
hesitation exist is correct, a negative impact could occur in regard to
foreign affairs, national security, and extraterritorial matters. And in
the abstract, that may seem to be the case. However, from a casespecific point of view, the opposite realization becomes relevant as
well. If the United States fails to allow these individuals to seek civil
liability and overcome qualified immunity in light of the lack of
adequate alternative remedies and special factors counseling
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hesitation, that could cause even worse and farther-reaching
ramifications for those issues.
VII. Conclusion
These are complicated issues and analyses that are by no
means meant to be taken lightly. Without further guidance from the
Supreme Court, lower courts will likely continue to struggle with
these types of situations and come to different opinions regarding
the appropriate decisions. However, until that guidance is provided,
it is important that courts strive to find the delicate balance between
not overturning qualified immunity overzealously, but also not
allowing it to obstruct judicious outcomes. Although both courts in
this instance came to logical conclusions based on their
understandings of the Supreme Court’s rulings, the Ninth Circuit
seems to have reached the most effective, unbiased outcome.
Precluding Bivens remedies in these cases precludes not just one
means of overcoming qualified immunity, but all possibilities of
civil remedy in general. Because of the unreasonable nature of the
actions committed by the relevant border patrol agents, Bivens
should be extended so that qualified immunity should not obstruct
justice and accountability.

29

